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[31 C.2d 1173; 1112 P.2d 758]

[L. A. No. 20145. In Bank. Apr. 23, 1948.]

B. P. HALL et ai., Respondents, v. HENRY CHAMBERLAIN et aI., Appellants.
[1] Taxation-Tax Deeds-Ourative Acts.-A statute enacted to
cure errors or irregularities in tax sales and deeds is of no
avail to a person claiming title by virtue of a tax deed from
the state where the right of a transferee of the person having
title at the time the delinquent tax proceedings were initiated,
vested prior to the effective date of the curative statute.
[2] Id.-Actions Affecting Tax Titles - Burden of Proof. -In a
quiet-title action by one claiming under a deed on foreclosure
of mortgage against the holder of a tax title,. the defendants
elaiming ineffectiveness of the foreclosure deed because not
recorded until dtcr the curative tax act have the burden of
proving that when the state took the tax deed or when the
eurative act became effective it acted in good faith and without notice of plaintiff's interest.
[8] Id.-Sale for Delinquent Taxes-Sale to State-Notice of Sale.
-A notice of sale was fatally defective where it failed to comply with the existing law in that it failed to state correctly
the amount for which the property was sold to the state, but
instead, under the heading "Least amount accepted at sale,"
specified an amount greater than that for which the property
was801d.
[4] Id.-Tax Deeds-Effect.-Under former Pol Code, 55 3786,
3787, the tax deed was only prima facie evidence of due publication of the delinquent tax list and the giving of notice.
[5] Id.-Tax Deeds-Effect.-Under former Pol. Code, § 3786, •
direction that notice of sale to the state be returned to the
sender if not delivered within a certain time different from
that fUed in the statute was a fatal defect which was not cured
by the tax deed.
[8] Id.-Tax Deeds-Effect.-A tax deed from the state is not
conclusive evidence of the regularity of all the proceedings to
its execution where the interest of an intervening owner intervened before the enactment changing the former rule and
making the tax deed conclusive evidence. (See Rev. & Tax.

[1] See 24 OalJur. 30,472; 51 Am.Jur. 678.
iricK. Dig. References: [1] Taxation, § 347; [2] Taxation, 5380;
[3] Taxation, § 312; [4] Taxation, § 366(4}t [5] Taxation,
§ 366(3); [6] Taxation, § 368; [7] Limitation of Actions, § 135;
[8] Taxation, § 377.1; [9] Limitation -of Actions, § 144c.acs-a
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Code, § 3nl, formerly Pol. Code, § 3836.1,as added in
Stats.1939, eh. 529.)
[7] Limitation of Aetions-Pleading.-A statute of limitations
waived if it is not pleaded.
[8] Taxation-Actions Meeting Tax Titles-Limitations.-In aD
action to quiet title by the holders of a mortgage foreclosure"
deed against claimants under a tax deed, defendants could not
rely on the statute of limitations without pleading it.
[9] Limitation of Actions-Pleading.-To justify application
the rule that the statute of limitations may be pleaded by
pleading the facts rather than by making a specific reference
to the statute, there must be some expression in the pleadmg'that lateness of the commencement of the action is a ground of ,<
defense.
;'

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ven- ;
tura County. Ernest D. Wagner, Judge assigned. Affirmed.
Action to quiet title to real property. Judgment for plain-'~
tiffs affirmed.
'
M. Arthur Waite, District Attorney, Julien G. Hathaway,
Deputy District Attorney, Edward C. Maxwell and William
T. Selby for Appellants.

Fred N. Bowser, Attorney General, and E. G. Benard, Deputy Attorney General, as amici curiae on behalf of Appellants. ,
Wm. MacKenzie Brown and Chas. F. Gerard for Respondents.
CARTER, J .-This appeal involves an action to quiet title
by plaintiffs based upon their claim of ownership of real prop- ,
erty by virtue of a title derived from the predecessor of the .
record owner (that is, the owner whose title was claimed to
have been divested by proceedings for sale of the property
for delinquent taxes). Defendants, Henry and Katherine
Chamberlain, based their claim of title on a tax deed from
the state. Plaintiffs prevailed in the court below, the court
finding fatal irregularities in the delinquent tax aaIes and I
tax deeds.
•
It appears that in 1932, Pan American Bank of California i
(the predecessor in title of plaintiffs) was the owner of the I
properly. The taxes assessed on the property for that y.~)
not haTing been paid, the property was sold to the state 'b1 ;
(7] See 16 Oal.Jur. 603; 34 Am.Jur. 333.
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operation of law in 1933. The court found that the Oalifornia Bank became the owner of the property on February 14,
1938, by "Oommissioner's Deed on Foreclosure:' evidently
the result of a mortga~e foreclosure in which the Pan American Bank of Oalifornia was the owner-mortgagor and the
California Bank the mortgagee. Five years having elapsed
since the sale to the state, the tax collector conveyed the
property to the state by tax deed on July 1, 1938. On July 9,
1943, the Oalifornia Banlt conveyed the property to plaintift's.
Following delinquent tax proceedings the state sold the property to the Ohamberlains and executed a tax deed to them
on March 20, 1944. The curative acts (statutes healing irregularities in tax sale proceedings) relied upon by the
Chamberlains as remedying any irregularities in the tax sales
and deeds, became effective on August 4, 1943, and thereafter.
(Stats. 1943, ch. 458; Stats. 1945, ch. 1134.)
[1] Before discussing the alleged irregularities in the
tax sales and deeds it must first be observed that the curative
acts (supra) are of no avail to the Ohamberlains in view of
the rule announced by this court in Miller v. McKenna, 23
Oa1.2d 774 [147 P.2d 531]. In that case some of the property
was sold to the state for delinquent taxes in 1912 and the
rest in 1918. The first part was sold and conveyed by the
state to a private purchaser in 1917, and the remainder in
1923. Like in the instant case, defendants rested their title
on tax deeds. Plaintiffs' title was based upon an interest
gained from a sherift"s sale and deed in a mortgage foreclosure proceeding in 1937, the mortgage having been executed in 1915. The' essence of the holding in the Miller case,
as later stated by this court, was that: "The decision . . •
withheld from the application of the [curative] act, in accordance with the limitation of section 2 (b) thereof, the vested
right of the plaintiff which had intervened prior to the effective date of the curative datute." [Emphasis added.]
(City of Compton v. Boland, 26 Oal.2d 310, 313. 314 [158
P.2d 397].) An effort is made to distinguish the Miller case
on the ground that there the mortgagee had an interest prior
to the institution of tax proceedings, but even assuming that
would make a difference, the mortgage in the Miller case was
executed after the sale by operation of law to the state for
delinquent taxes. In any event we fail to see what dift'erence
it makes. As seen from the facts in the Miller case and the
interpretation of its holding in City of Compton v. Boland,
supra, the essential test is whether the owner -'(that is, the
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person having title at the time delinquent tax proceedings
were initiated) has thereafter transferred to a third person
or such person has acquired his title to the propcrty prior to
the e1iective date of the curative acts.
[2] It is argued by the Chamberlains that because the deed
from the California Bank to the plainti1is was not recorded
until August 16, 1943, after the effective date of the curative
act, the Miller case is not controlling in view of the provisions
of the recording acts voiding unrecorded interests in real
property as against a subsequently recorded interest acquired
in good faith and for a valuable consideration (see Civ. Code,
§§ 1214,1215). Their claim appears to be that when the 1943
curative act became effective, the tax deed to the state, although theretofore executed and recorded, became valid, and
as it was recorded before the deed from the California Bank
to plainti1is, the latter is ineffective. This argument cannot
prevail for the obvious reason, that the burden was on the
Chamberlains of proving that the state, when it took thl! deed
or when the curative act became effective, was acting in good
faith-without notice of plaintiffs' interest. (Bell v. Pleasant,
145 Cal. 410 [78 P. 957, 104 Am.St.Rep. 61] ; Thomas v. VanLieu, 28 Cal. 616; Chapman v. Ostergard, 73 Cal.App. 739
[238 P. 1081] ; Lindley v. Blumberg, 7 Cal.App. 140 [93 P.
894]) and there is no evidence on that subject.
[3] Among the irregularities urged in the tax sale process, is the claim that the notice of the sale to the state, culminating in the deed to the state on July 1, 1938, failed to specify
the correct amount of taxes for which the property was assessed and sold. The published delinquent tax'iist in 1933
upon which the sale by operation of law was basM, lists the
delinquency as $56.46, which presumably embraced all taxes,
penalties and (lOsts due on the property as prescribed by section 3764 of the Political Code in 1933. The addenda to the
delinquent tax list which was published in 1938 and led to
the deed to the state of July 1, 1938, stated that notice was
given that on July 1, 1938, the following described property
would be deeded to the state on July 1,1938, unless redeemed.
Under a column designated" Least Amount Accepted at Sale,"
and opposite a description of the property here involved, appears the sum of $58.46 ($2.00 more than the amount in the
first mentioned delinquent list). At the time of the publication and the execution of the deed to the state, provision was
made for deeding the propcrty to the state rather than a sale
to a private purchaser (Pol. Code, § 3817 d, as of 1938), and
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the notice of such deeding was required to be published in the
addenda and to state the amount for which the property was
sold to the state (that is, previously sold by operation of law).
(Pol. Code, § 3817d, as of 1938.) As seen, the addenda in the
instant case did not purport to give the amount for which the
property was sold to the state but listed the amount under the
heading "Least Amount Accepted at Sale" and the amount
was $2.00 greater than the amount for which the property was
sold to the state.
The delinquent list with the addenda constituted the only
notice to the owner that his property would be deeded to the
state. The notice was defective in that it failed to state correctly the amount for which the property was sold to the state
and the designation of the nature of the figure stated. It
therefore failed to comply with the statute. Such failure to
comply with the statute in regard to notice is fatal. (Knokf
v. Swan, 2 Ca1.2d 630 [42 P.2d 1019, 97 A.L.R. 841]; Gott8fein v. Kelly, 206 Cal. 742 [276 P. 347] ; HalZ v. Park Bank
of Los AngeZes, 165 Cal. 536 [132 P. 452] ; M't1Zer v. WilZiams,
135 Cal. 183 [67 P. 788] ; Warden v. Gries, 120 Cal.App. 187
[7 P.2d 342]; Warden v. Broome, 9 Cal.App.172 [98 P. 252].)
[4] The Chamberlains argue, however, that the deed to
the state was conclusive evidence of compliance with the law.
At the time of the deed to the state the statutes provided that
the deed was "primary evidence that: 1. The property was
assessed as required by law; 2. The property was equalized
as required by law; 3. The taxes were levied in accordance
with law; 4. The taxes were not paid; 5. At a proper time
and place the property was, sold as prescribed by law, and by
the proper officer; 6. The property was not redeemed;
7. The person who executed the deed was the proper officer;
8. Where the real estate was sold to pay a poll-tax or taxes
on personal property, that the real estate belonged to the
person liable to pay the tax." [Emphasis added.] (Pol.
Code, § 3786.) The following section reads: "Such deed,
duly acknowledged or proved, is (except as against actual
fraud) conclusive evidence of the regularity of all other proceedings, from the assessment of the assessor, inclusive, up
to the execution of the deed." [Emphasis added.] (Pol. Code,
§ 3787.) These sections must be read together, and it is apparent that section 3787, which gives the effect of conclusive
evidence as to all other proceedings, must refer to proceedings
other than those mentioned in section 3786. As to the latter,
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the decd is only prima facie evidence. (Bernhard v. walt
184 Cal. 612 [194 P. 1040) ; McDonough v. Cooper, 179 cat.
384 [177 P. 153]; Hayes v. Ducasse, 119 Cal. 682 [52}'!"'1
121].) [5] It is apparent, therefore, that under those sectionl
(Pol. Code, §§ 3786, 3787) the deed is prima facie but not
conclusive evidence of due publication of the delinquent tai"
list and the giving of notice (see Gramson v. Geniella, 209 c8Jj
610 [289 P. 817] ; Scott v. Beck, 204 Cal. 78 [266 P. 951];
Bell v. Brigance, 74 Cal.App. 322 [240 P. 50]), and where a
notice is mailed, a direction to return it to the sender if not.t
delivered within a certain time (which is different from that1
fixed in the statute) is fatal. (Joslin v. Shaffer, 66 Cal.App.<
69 [225 P. 307].) It must, therefore, follow, that the defecl,
in the published delinquent tax list which gave notice of the
deeding of the property to the state, being embraced within.
the italicized portion of subdivision 5 of section 3786 as above
quoted, was not cured by the deed here involved which was
only prima facie evidence of the regularity of the tax sale .
proceedings. For those reasons we hold that the notice here
involved, which failed to comply with the statute (specify correct amount for redemption of property), constituted a defect i
in the sale, and hence the property was not sold at a proper J
time and place as required by law under subdivision 5 of section 3786. The presumption to the contrary is rebuttable and
falls under section 3786 rather than section 3787. It was re-,
butted in this case.
('.
[6] It is urged that the deed I~~in the state to the Chamberlains executed in 1944 was conclusive evidence of the regu- \.
larity of all the proceedings from and including the assessment.
But in 1938, when the property was deeded in the foreclosure proceeding to the California Bank, such tax deed was
merely prima facie evidence of the regularity of such proceedings. (Pol. Code, § 3897, as it read in 1938.) Although
such a deed was later made conclusive evidence (see Rev. &
Tax. Code, § 3711 formerly Pol. Code, § 3836.1 as added in
1939, Stats. 1939, ch. 529), that change in the law, if applied
to the facts of this case, would have the same effect as a curative act. Before it was made conclusive evidence the interest
of California Bank had intervened, and under Miller v. McKenna, npra, its interest was vested and could not be divested
by the change in the law. The plaintiffs, although they acquired their title after the change in the evidentiary effect
of the deed, acquired the right of the California Bank. If
that were not true the vested interest of an intervening owner
I·
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would be of small value, inasmuch as any change in the law
validating the tax proceedings after he acquired his intereSt
would deprive him of the right to transfer such interest. Such
cases as Mercury Herald Co. v. Moore~ 22 Ca1.2d 269 [138
P.2d 673, 147 A.L.R. 1111] ; Bray v. Jones, 20 Ca1.2d 858 [129
P.2d 857] ; South San Joaquin lrr. Dist. v. Neumiller, 2 Cal.
2d 485 [42 P.2d 64], and Buck v. Canty, 162 Cal. 226 [121 P.
924], to the effect that the state may, at any time after property
is dE>eded to the state, change the method of its disposition and
cut off the right to redeem, do not alter the result. Here we
have statutes purporting to eure defects, which, to be applicable here, and cut off an intervening vested right, must cure
a fatal defect in the proceeding for sale of the property to the
state.
Finally, it is urged that plaintiffs' action is barred by the
limitation provision found in the Revenue and Taxation Code,
reading: "A proceeding based on an alleged invalidity or
irregularity of any deed to the State for taxes or of any proceedings leading up to the deed can only be commenced within
one year after the date of recording of the deed to the State
in the county recorder's office or within one year after June
~, 1941, whichever is later.
•• Sections 351 and 358, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply to the time within which a proceeding
may be brought under the provisions of this section." (Rev.
& Tax. Code, § 3521.)
It is conceded that the time limitation specified in said
section had elapsed when the instant action was comInenced.
However, prior to the decision of this case by the District
Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two
(Hall v. Chamberlain, (Cal.App.) 183 P.2d 743) no mention
of the above-quoted section was made by any of the parties
nor was any claim made by them that the proceeding was not
timely brought. The Chamberlains first relied upon that section in this court after the District Court of Appeal bad made
it a ground for its decision.
[7] The general rule is firmly established that if a statute
of limitation is not pleaded it is waived. (16 Cal.Jur. 603604.) [8] In the instant case plaintiffs' action was phrased in
the conventional terms of one to quiet title. Inasmuch as tax
deeds were outstanding, for plaintiffs to prevail it was incumbent upon them to negative such deeds, and the Chamberlains
should have pleaded the statute of limitation to that issue.
Even if we put the matter in a different way, that is, assum-
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ing that plaintiffs would rely upon their conveyance from th;
record owner, defendants would counter with the tax deeds,.
plaintiffs would assert the invalidity of those deeds, and d~
fendants would reply that the statute had run, the need for',
pleading the statute still exists.
' .~
[9] To escape the effect of the general rule the Chamberlains advance the argument that statutes of limitation may b8~
pleaded by pleading the facts rather than making a specific;
reference to the statute involved. They rely upon such cases'
as Osborn v. Hopkins, 160 Cal. 501 [117 P. 519, Ann.Cas.
1913A 413]; Tofte v. Tofte, 12 Cal.App.2d 111 [54 P.2d
1137]; Franklin v. Southern Pacific Co., 40 Cal.App. 31.
[180 P. 76], and refer to the allegations in the answer of d~'
fendant Ventura County: "That on or about the 1st day of'
July, 1938, the defendant Robert S. Cooney, duly elected, ,
qualified and acting Tax Collector of the County of Ventura,·,
did execute and deliver to the State of California a deed conveying to the State of California the property described in
said paragraph III, for delinquent taxes as provided by law,
said deed being recorded in Volume 498, at page 380, Official
Records of Ventura County; that thereafter, on or about'
March 20, 1944, in the manner provided by law, the said '
property was sold by the said Robert S. Cooney to the defendant Henry Chamberlain; that thereafter the said Robert S.
Cooney duly made and executed a deed conveying said property to the said Henry Chamberlain, said deed being recorded .
in Volume 691, at page 283, Official Records of Ventura'
County." Assuming defendants, the Chamberlains, may take
advantage of the pleading of the codefendant, Ventura
County, yet the "facts" are not pleaded. The essence of the
rule requiring the statute to be pleaded is to apprise plaintiff
that defendant intends to rely upon that defense. While it
may be that inferentially, the times being stated, it follows
that the action was, not timely filed under the statute, yet
more is required. There must be some expression that lateness
of the commencement of the action is a ground of defense. It
is the contention of the Chamberlains that the effect of seetion 3521 is' to vest title in the state, but it is manifestly nothing more than an ordinary statute of limitation, that is, •
personal defense which may be waived.
The judgment is affirmed.

,1'

Gibson,
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TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent.
Had the property remained in the hands of the owner-mortgagor until the effective date of the Curative Act of 1943,
the deed to the state would unquestionably have been validated by that act. (Miller v. McKenna, 23 Cal.2d 774, 781782 [147 P.2d 531], and cases there cited.) Under the majority opinion, however, the rights of plaintiffs and their
immediate predecessor in interest, whether or not they had
actual or constructive notice of the claims of the state, are
greater than those of the owner-mortgagor, even though they
took title to the land subject to the prior claims of the state
for the delinquent taxes.
The question whether plaintiffs or their predecessor are
bona fide purchasers is not considered in the majority opinion
or in Miller v. McKenna, supra, upon which it relies, although
the rule relied upon is designed solely for the protection of
innocent third persons. (McFaddin v. Evans-Snider-Buel 00.,
185 U.S. 505, 510-511 [22 8.Ct. 758, 46 L.Ed. 1012] ; United
Statcs Mortgage 00. v. Gross, 93 Ill. 483,494, aff'd, 108 U.S.
477 [2 S.Ct. 940, 27 L.Ed. 795] ; see 16 Am.Jur. 449.) The
foreclosure deed to the California Bank was executed after
the taxes had been delinquent for nearly five years. Plaintiff
did not even show that the California Bank acquired the foreclosure deed without actual notice of the claim of the state for
taxes, which was a matter of public record. The plaintiffs
themselves acquired whatever rights the California Bank had
in the property after the deed to the state had been recorded,
and there is no shoWing that they acquired that interest without actual notice of the claims of the state.
Under established principles of law plaintiffs could have
no rights against the state superior to that of their predecessors in interest. The court in this case and in the Miller
case creates for plaintiffs a vested right in the minor defects
in the tax deed to the state. I can find no basis in reason or
authority for the creation of this right and must therefore
dissent for the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in
Miller v. McKenna, IUpra, 23 Cal.2d 774, 792.
Edmonds, J., concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied May 20,
1948. Traynor, J., voted for a rehearing.

